Apparently, Trent from Pink Is the New Blog is on the Hillary bandwagon.
In far less important news, the AP may have made a big shift this afternoon when Charles Babington was noted, seemingly for the first time, as the AP's Presidential campaign correspondent at the bottom of the wire service's article on Obama's response to Bush's Hamas comments. Rasmussen stops daily tracking polls, the Dems stop going for each others' throats, and now this -- guess the general election really is starting.
Friday, May 16, 2008
Wednesday, May 14, 2008
McCain and the NRA
Ambinder is covering the NRA endorsement better than we could, so check that post out.
This is less interesting for its position as for its style. As McCain tries to chart his path between swing voters and the conservative base, he will be seeking endorsements from a variety of staple conservative interest groups. While some may choose to dodge the election entirely and others may throw personal history and voting records to the wind to issue glowing endorsements, this may be the first of many painfully honest statements from key GOP leaning organizations. More from the AP:
"We've had our disagreements, everybody knows it. I guess we'll just have to agree to disagree on those. We're not foolish enough to ignore the vast areas of agreement in which John McCain has been a friend to gun owners."
This is less interesting for its position as for its style. As McCain tries to chart his path between swing voters and the conservative base, he will be seeking endorsements from a variety of staple conservative interest groups. While some may choose to dodge the election entirely and others may throw personal history and voting records to the wind to issue glowing endorsements, this may be the first of many painfully honest statements from key GOP leaning organizations. More from the AP:
National Rifle Association chief Wayne LaPierre says Republican John McCain isn't in lockstep with the group on every issue, but the nation's gun owners aren't "foolish enough" to ignore their common ground.
...
LaPierre was critical of Democrats Barack Obama and Hillary Rodham Clinton, saying both are pandering to gun owners by "mouthing pro-Second Amendment words."
Elation, But...
The Mississippi First is fantastic news - there is no other way to put it. The decline of the GOP brand, a regional party's loss in its region, the failure to tie a conservative Dem to Wright or Obama - any of one these would be reason alone to dance in the streets. Add on Cole sending up warning flares, and it just keeps getting better - even if he may not be around for long. But...
We should be cautious not to get ahead of ourselves. As nice as it is to see the GOP seemingly collapse into total disarray, the fight in November has yet to be fought. The Democrats won in 2006 thanks to focus and discipline in message, candidate selection, and funding. To borrow from Alan Greenspan, we should be wary of falling prey to irrational exuberance when the time comes to make the tough decisions in the coming months. There is little question now that the 50 State strategy is paying dividends, but Dean's playbook calls less for throwing the hail mary in the all 110 GOP seats seemingly easier to take than the MS01 than building operations that make victories like Childers' possible when the opportunities present themselves.
Make no mistake, every Republican should be watching their back this cycle. This will help us across the board as those who would ordinarily focus on raising money for their colleagues instead batten down the hatches and leave nothing to chance on the home front, but if the blogosphere is awash in fundraising pleas premised on little more than "The MS01 was R+10, so we can win in..." we may start putting our eggs into the wrong baskets.
Of course, it's difficult for me to fill in a sample district, because R+9 districts include the AZ02 where Thrasher could do it this time, the CO04 where Musgrave is again in danger, and the IN08 which was one of the big pickup Dem pickups in '06 thanks to Brad Ellsworth. Hunting season's open, folks!
We should be cautious not to get ahead of ourselves. As nice as it is to see the GOP seemingly collapse into total disarray, the fight in November has yet to be fought. The Democrats won in 2006 thanks to focus and discipline in message, candidate selection, and funding. To borrow from Alan Greenspan, we should be wary of falling prey to irrational exuberance when the time comes to make the tough decisions in the coming months. There is little question now that the 50 State strategy is paying dividends, but Dean's playbook calls less for throwing the hail mary in the all 110 GOP seats seemingly easier to take than the MS01 than building operations that make victories like Childers' possible when the opportunities present themselves.
Make no mistake, every Republican should be watching their back this cycle. This will help us across the board as those who would ordinarily focus on raising money for their colleagues instead batten down the hatches and leave nothing to chance on the home front, but if the blogosphere is awash in fundraising pleas premised on little more than "The MS01 was R+10, so we can win in..." we may start putting our eggs into the wrong baskets.
Of course, it's difficult for me to fill in a sample district, because R+9 districts include the AZ02 where Thrasher could do it this time, the CO04 where Musgrave is again in danger, and the IN08 which was one of the big pickup Dem pickups in '06 thanks to Brad Ellsworth. Hunting season's open, folks!
Monday, May 12, 2008
Another Reason Not To Care
With West Virginia rapidly approaching, and forecasting a major win for the Clinton campaign, it's worth taking a look at the state a little beyond the cursory poll numbers that are flashing like a neon sign of demographic problem .
For one, the Democrats have failed pretty miserably in West Virginia despite picking the winner of its primary for the last two years. "In 2000, Al Gore won seventy-two percent of West Virginia Democratic Primary voters and lost the state's general election to George Bush by six percent; in 2004, John Kerry won sixty-nine percent of West Virginia Democratic Primary voters and lost the state's general election to George Bush by thirteen percent." This isn't to say that the demographics of West Virginia can't tell us something about how other states will vote, but we should be wary of making a mountain out of a molehill that we can't conquer.
This isn't to say that the Democrats should write off the state - we hold two of three congressional districts and both senate seats - but we should be aware that national Democrats haven't fared particularly well in the Mountain State in recent cycles.
Also, not to hate on West Virginia, but this excerpt from the poll is comical, if not telling: "West Virginia Democratic voters appeared to be in denial about the delegate projections. Asked who would be the next president, regardless of whom they personally supported, 31 percent said Clinton; 27 percent, Obama; 26 percent, McCain; and 11 percent were undecided." So the person predicted most likely to win the general, in the eyes of the West Virginia democratic voters, is the person least likely to make it out of the primary. So much for a better informed electorate.
For one, the Democrats have failed pretty miserably in West Virginia despite picking the winner of its primary for the last two years. "In 2000, Al Gore won seventy-two percent of West Virginia Democratic Primary voters and lost the state's general election to George Bush by six percent; in 2004, John Kerry won sixty-nine percent of West Virginia Democratic Primary voters and lost the state's general election to George Bush by thirteen percent." This isn't to say that the demographics of West Virginia can't tell us something about how other states will vote, but we should be wary of making a mountain out of a molehill that we can't conquer.
This isn't to say that the Democrats should write off the state - we hold two of three congressional districts and both senate seats - but we should be aware that national Democrats haven't fared particularly well in the Mountain State in recent cycles.
Also, not to hate on West Virginia, but this excerpt from the poll is comical, if not telling: "West Virginia Democratic voters appeared to be in denial about the delegate projections. Asked who would be the next president, regardless of whom they personally supported, 31 percent said Clinton; 27 percent, Obama; 26 percent, McCain; and 11 percent were undecided." So the person predicted most likely to win the general, in the eyes of the West Virginia democratic voters, is the person least likely to make it out of the primary. So much for a better informed electorate.
Clinton Brings in the House
This letter and PowerPoint from the Clinton campaign were circulated around the internet in the days following the Indiana and North Carolina primaries. At the time, they were covered for little more than their place in the narrative of Clinton's last gasps before an eventual departure. Now that we're perhaps a bit better adjusted to the concept of Clinton staying in the race, however, it's interesting to look at what the message actually contains.
On the surface, it's a standard reassertion of the arguments that she's made before - she performs better with older, Hispanic, and rural voters. The decision to frame the issue by way of the House victories in 2006 and the competitive seats in 2008, however, is a bit of a new twist. Looking at the midterms, and equating her successes in those districts with the victories eighteen months ago, there are a number of implicit arguments. Apart from the argument that she wins in competitive districts, and presumably by extension in competitive states, there's an attempt to construct an argument by analogy. That the victories in those difficult districts during the 2006 race were the product of special people with a special message, and now she is that special.
The other argument, and probably the most important one, is connected to the 2008 midterm elections. If it's true that Clinton outperforms Obama in the competitive districts, then it stands to reason that democratic candidates in competitive districts would benefit from having her at the top of the ticket. At this point, it's essential to remember that the letter and PowerPoint weren't written for the public. Not that they were intended to be hidden from the blogosphere or the voters, but they created for superdelegates. Now, if we're to believe that superdelegates are exclusively concerned with winning the presidency, then her argument is an important one in that it shows strength in competitive districts, but this is nothing new. But if we consider the notion that some superdelegates are concerned, perhaps not to a level of parity with the presidency but concerned nonetheless, with the congressional outcomes, then the decision calculus may be far different than is being discussed publicly. From a game theory perspective, if the payoffs of the two candidates in the presidential race are comparable, but the payoffs in the congressional elections are radically different, the optimal choice would be to pick the candidate that ensures the best congressional outcome.
Of course, none of this is to say that Clinton would perform best in the swing districts or bring the best outcome in the House and Senate, but this seems to be the argument she's making, and it's one that bears further examination than the implicit assertions she's putting forward. As the special elections in Louisiana and Mississippi progress, we're starting to get a sense of some of the congressional terrain for 2008, and most of it has more to do with the GOP failing than anyone at the top of the ticket.
On the surface, it's a standard reassertion of the arguments that she's made before - she performs better with older, Hispanic, and rural voters. The decision to frame the issue by way of the House victories in 2006 and the competitive seats in 2008, however, is a bit of a new twist. Looking at the midterms, and equating her successes in those districts with the victories eighteen months ago, there are a number of implicit arguments. Apart from the argument that she wins in competitive districts, and presumably by extension in competitive states, there's an attempt to construct an argument by analogy. That the victories in those difficult districts during the 2006 race were the product of special people with a special message, and now she is that special.
The other argument, and probably the most important one, is connected to the 2008 midterm elections. If it's true that Clinton outperforms Obama in the competitive districts, then it stands to reason that democratic candidates in competitive districts would benefit from having her at the top of the ticket. At this point, it's essential to remember that the letter and PowerPoint weren't written for the public. Not that they were intended to be hidden from the blogosphere or the voters, but they created for superdelegates. Now, if we're to believe that superdelegates are exclusively concerned with winning the presidency, then her argument is an important one in that it shows strength in competitive districts, but this is nothing new. But if we consider the notion that some superdelegates are concerned, perhaps not to a level of parity with the presidency but concerned nonetheless, with the congressional outcomes, then the decision calculus may be far different than is being discussed publicly. From a game theory perspective, if the payoffs of the two candidates in the presidential race are comparable, but the payoffs in the congressional elections are radically different, the optimal choice would be to pick the candidate that ensures the best congressional outcome.
Of course, none of this is to say that Clinton would perform best in the swing districts or bring the best outcome in the House and Senate, but this seems to be the argument she's making, and it's one that bears further examination than the implicit assertions she's putting forward. As the special elections in Louisiana and Mississippi progress, we're starting to get a sense of some of the congressional terrain for 2008, and most of it has more to do with the GOP failing than anyone at the top of the ticket.
Wednesday, May 7, 2008
Looking to November
We may catch back up on the primary noise later, but for now I wanted to call attention to this Krugman post, and what will likely be some recurring themes throughout this general election season. This graph brings to the forefront what will be two major issues in the election - the economy and the Republican party. The former's impact will be obvious, as pocketbook voting is as tangible an electoral theory as any commentator could hope for, but the reflection of the GOP on John McCain will be far more ambiguous. Despite attempts to quantify and qualify its nature now, the development of this issue will be the biggest question of the general election season. If McCain turns the election from the Democrats vs. the Republicans to McCain vs. Obama vs. The Bush Legacy, we could be in for a very strange ride.
The State of the Race
Lets stipulate a few things.
(1) Hillary Clinton is not, by staying in the race, going to win the nomination. She is hopelessly behind in number of states won, certainly going to lose the pledged delegate count, incredibly likely going to end up with less of the popular vote, and increasingly in trouble with the superdelegates. (Since OH, during some of his worst weeks of the campaign, Obama has picked up something like 2x the number of supers than she has).
(2) Staying in the race does not give her much more credibility to be the nominee if Obama has a colossal skeleton fall out of his closet before the convention, as she could still sweep in during such an unlikely scenario.
(3) Despite the fact that the math has not really changed since March 4, the media is no longer going to give HRC a free ride on the chances of her being the nominee. Starting last night, as the pundits saw an ever diminishing Clinton lead in Indiana, the narrative quickly became Hillary Clinton: the candidate without a chance. Even if there is a pathway to the nomination (necessarily including Florida and Michigan, and trying eek out a lead in the popular vote, thereby convincing the superdelegates to turn to her), the media seems unwilling to continue to give her the benefit of that doubt.
When you think about this, and a whole lot else, it is easy to justify calls for Clinton to exit the race. In fact, some who have supported her are already making that call. It is much more interesting, however, to think about the advantages of a continued Clinton presidential campaign, albeit one with a much different purpose and tone than has been the case for the last few weeks.
Mark Ambinder's "7 Reasons Why Clinton Should Stay In The Race" contains some very interesting things to think about, and that I hope the Clinton campaign is thinking about.
In particular I'd like to highlight:
(1) Florida and Michigan - If Clinton drops out, Florida and Michigan's delegates may be seated. This is good. I'm not sure, however, if the damage to the Demotratic party's reputation can be repaired as effectively as if Clinton is able to make a deal with the Obama campaign (behind closed doors) trading a seating of the delegates for her dropping out. There is a subtle but important difference here. If Clinton stays in the race and the delegations are seated, Florida and Michigan voters will have a champion for their cause, and once she endorsses Obama, they will likley move that way as well.
(3) Embarrassment - Obama's campaign says they are willing to "take our chances" with a Clinton-less election in WV. I wouldn't be as confident as they are, particularly with the party as polorized as it currently is, that Obama will win. This is particularly the case if her voters feel upset and vote in protest for their candidate, and Obama's supporters have much less motivation to turn out with the election all but certain. This could be incredibly problematic from my point of view. Despite his mathematical lock, it is important for the Obama campaign to truly understand that they are going to get the nomination with very slightly more than half of the electorate. If he can't even win states when he is really the only person running, this could be seen as particularly damaging, and a sign that the party is not willing to coalesce behind him. And we all know how these talking-heads talking-points turn into the truth rather than act as a reflection of it.
(5) The Party - This is the most important, and from what I can tell, least thought about, of Ambinder's points. With both candidates continuing the campaign into the rest of the states, they are building organizations and mobilizing voters that will be invaluable in the fall. This is done with money that can't be spent on the general election and in states where Democrats generally don't have a whole lot of infrastructure. This is a unique opportunity.
To these points I would only add one more:
With Obama as the only candidate from our party still in the race, there are two effects on John McCain. (1) He just can't quite credibly attack one candidate. Yes, he has been taking shots at Obama, but they seem to receive less attention and fall a bit flat. This is good for us for obvious reasons. (2) He gets less media attention. Once we shift into "general election mode" the campaign is going to start providing more coverage to all of these weekly campaign themes that have been going on. Yes, they have been covering a bit, but not as much as they will. Less media time for McCain the better. That doesn't mean that the party in general, and Obama in particular, can't go after McCain, it just means the media won't be obsessing over the GOP quite yet.
All of this is dependent, of course, on one thing: A positive message from Hillary Clinton. The remaining phase of her campaign could be about the Democratic party, her history and accomplishments, and her policy proposals. It should not be about Obama, or even be a contrast to an Obama candidacy. This has the advantage of, at the moment being good politics. Going negative didn't seem to work against Obama (think Wright, Bittergate, and Gas Tax Holiday). She won PA by 9 points, a good accomplishment but not the blowout that was expected, and she got less of the vote in NC and IN than expected. She can continue to connect with blue collar voters and champion their issues (John Edwards, anyone?) . In addition, this will give her the opportunity to rebuild her image, particularly with the party elite. Such a tactic, through negotiations, could be beneficial in other ways. She could negotiate a retiring of her campaign debt, possibly wrangle the offer of the VP Slot, and build credibility with the rest of the party.
Bottom line is, the Clinton campaign is not going to withdraw right away. She has sent staff to South Dakota, continues to have them in Oregon and has events planned in both states, plus West Virginia and Kentucky. If she continues to run the campaign she has in the last month, the negative reputation she has (re)developed is likely deserved. If she stays in the campaign but changes the purpose and tone of her project, she can potentially make up a lot of the ground that the Party has lost since March 4.
(1) Hillary Clinton is not, by staying in the race, going to win the nomination. She is hopelessly behind in number of states won, certainly going to lose the pledged delegate count, incredibly likely going to end up with less of the popular vote, and increasingly in trouble with the superdelegates. (Since OH, during some of his worst weeks of the campaign, Obama has picked up something like 2x the number of supers than she has).
(2) Staying in the race does not give her much more credibility to be the nominee if Obama has a colossal skeleton fall out of his closet before the convention, as she could still sweep in during such an unlikely scenario.
(3) Despite the fact that the math has not really changed since March 4, the media is no longer going to give HRC a free ride on the chances of her being the nominee. Starting last night, as the pundits saw an ever diminishing Clinton lead in Indiana, the narrative quickly became Hillary Clinton: the candidate without a chance. Even if there is a pathway to the nomination (necessarily including Florida and Michigan, and trying eek out a lead in the popular vote, thereby convincing the superdelegates to turn to her), the media seems unwilling to continue to give her the benefit of that doubt.
When you think about this, and a whole lot else, it is easy to justify calls for Clinton to exit the race. In fact, some who have supported her are already making that call. It is much more interesting, however, to think about the advantages of a continued Clinton presidential campaign, albeit one with a much different purpose and tone than has been the case for the last few weeks.
Mark Ambinder's "7 Reasons Why Clinton Should Stay In The Race" contains some very interesting things to think about, and that I hope the Clinton campaign is thinking about.
In particular I'd like to highlight:
(1) Florida and Michigan - If Clinton drops out, Florida and Michigan's delegates may be seated. This is good. I'm not sure, however, if the damage to the Demotratic party's reputation can be repaired as effectively as if Clinton is able to make a deal with the Obama campaign (behind closed doors) trading a seating of the delegates for her dropping out. There is a subtle but important difference here. If Clinton stays in the race and the delegations are seated, Florida and Michigan voters will have a champion for their cause, and once she endorsses Obama, they will likley move that way as well.
(3) Embarrassment - Obama's campaign says they are willing to "take our chances" with a Clinton-less election in WV. I wouldn't be as confident as they are, particularly with the party as polorized as it currently is, that Obama will win. This is particularly the case if her voters feel upset and vote in protest for their candidate, and Obama's supporters have much less motivation to turn out with the election all but certain. This could be incredibly problematic from my point of view. Despite his mathematical lock, it is important for the Obama campaign to truly understand that they are going to get the nomination with very slightly more than half of the electorate. If he can't even win states when he is really the only person running, this could be seen as particularly damaging, and a sign that the party is not willing to coalesce behind him. And we all know how these talking-heads talking-points turn into the truth rather than act as a reflection of it.
(5) The Party - This is the most important, and from what I can tell, least thought about, of Ambinder's points. With both candidates continuing the campaign into the rest of the states, they are building organizations and mobilizing voters that will be invaluable in the fall. This is done with money that can't be spent on the general election and in states where Democrats generally don't have a whole lot of infrastructure. This is a unique opportunity.
To these points I would only add one more:
With Obama as the only candidate from our party still in the race, there are two effects on John McCain. (1) He just can't quite credibly attack one candidate. Yes, he has been taking shots at Obama, but they seem to receive less attention and fall a bit flat. This is good for us for obvious reasons. (2) He gets less media attention. Once we shift into "general election mode" the campaign is going to start providing more coverage to all of these weekly campaign themes that have been going on. Yes, they have been covering a bit, but not as much as they will. Less media time for McCain the better. That doesn't mean that the party in general, and Obama in particular, can't go after McCain, it just means the media won't be obsessing over the GOP quite yet.
All of this is dependent, of course, on one thing: A positive message from Hillary Clinton. The remaining phase of her campaign could be about the Democratic party, her history and accomplishments, and her policy proposals. It should not be about Obama, or even be a contrast to an Obama candidacy. This has the advantage of, at the moment being good politics. Going negative didn't seem to work against Obama (think Wright, Bittergate, and Gas Tax Holiday). She won PA by 9 points, a good accomplishment but not the blowout that was expected, and she got less of the vote in NC and IN than expected. She can continue to connect with blue collar voters and champion their issues (John Edwards, anyone?) . In addition, this will give her the opportunity to rebuild her image, particularly with the party elite. Such a tactic, through negotiations, could be beneficial in other ways. She could negotiate a retiring of her campaign debt, possibly wrangle the offer of the VP Slot, and build credibility with the rest of the party.
Bottom line is, the Clinton campaign is not going to withdraw right away. She has sent staff to South Dakota, continues to have them in Oregon and has events planned in both states, plus West Virginia and Kentucky. If she continues to run the campaign she has in the last month, the negative reputation she has (re)developed is likely deserved. If she stays in the campaign but changes the purpose and tone of her project, she can potentially make up a lot of the ground that the Party has lost since March 4.
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